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Police use of violence against civilians is one of the most significant socio-
legal problems of our time.1 The rule of law is rendered meaningless if civilians 
cannot trust the police to respect their rights. For many, especially poor people 
and members of minority communities, the threat of violence at the hands of 
police is almost as significant as concern about ordinary crime. In recent years, 
the public’s attention has become increasingly focused on police killings of ci-
vilians in the United States and around the world. To address this issue, countries 
across the globe have passed statutes, regulations, and voluntary codes of con-
duct that regulate when law enforcement agents are permitted to use violence. 
Despite the ubiquity of the problem, these laws and policies are a jumble of dif-
fering standards. Some are laws enacted by legislatures, some are local ordi-
nances, and some are self-imposed, voluntary codes of conduct created by police 
agencies themselves. Some policies are comprehensive and place significant lim-
itations on when law enforcement can employ violence. Others are little more 
than loose standards that permit law enforcement personnel to decide for them-
selves when and how to use violence against civilians.2 
 
 1 The problem of police brutality is global and persistent and has generated substantial 
scholarship and advocacy work. See generally JILL NELSON, POLICE BRUTALITY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY (Jill Nelson ed., 2000) (tracing the history of police violence in the United States 
and analyzing reasons for its persistence); HUMAN RTS. WATCH, “KETTLING’’ PROTESTERS IN 
THE BRONX: SYSTEMIC POLICE BRUTALITY AND ITS COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/30/kettling-protesters-bronx/systemic-police-brutality-
and-its-costs-united-states (describing the police response to anti-brutality protests and a his-
tory of police brutality in the United States); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “MY JOB IS TO KILL’’: 
ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND IMPUNITY IN THE PHILIPPINES (2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3530852020ENGLISH.PDF (docu-
menting abuse by government law enforcement agents); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA: 
TIME TO END IMPUNITY TORTURE AND OTHER VIOLATIONS BY SPECIAL ANTI-ROBBERY SQUAD 
(SARS) (2020), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4495052020 
ENGLISH.PDF (describing abusive practices by law enforcement agents against civilians). 
 2 The Police Use of Force Project maintains a database of use-of-force policies. See gen-
erally POLICE USE OF FORCE PROJECT, http://useofforceproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
The Project analyzed use-of-force policies for the 100 largest cities in the United States and 
graded them on certain characteristics, such as mandatory de-escalation policies or a require-
ment of warning before shooting. For example, until very recently the Kansas City, Missouri 
policy did not require de-escalation, did not ban chokeholds or strangleholds, did not require 
officers to exhaust all other means before shooting, and did not prohibit shooting at moving 
vehicles. Response to Resistance, KAN. CITY MO. POLICE DEP’T (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/571ff92759827e8a7107
0967/1461713191849/Kansas+City+use+of+force+policy.pdf. 
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Alongside this patchwork of laws and policies are international human rights 
standards that define the rights to which civilians are entitled. Prominent among 
them is the right to be free from unwarranted force or violence.3 Human rights 
standards are binding commitments by states to make the rule of law a lived re-
ality for their citizenry. Even when using force to protect civilians and enforce 
the law, these standards impose limits on the actions law enforcement bodies and 
their personnel may take. 
In an important new article, Claudia Flores and her co-authors have analyzed 
a sample of laws and policies regarding police use of lethal force to assess 
whether they comport with relevant international human rights standards.4 Flores 
and her team found that most of the policies studied were inadequate on one or 
more important dimensions. The Flores study is a significant step forward in the 
struggle to prohibit the abuse of civilians at the hands of law enforcement. Such 
policies are the foundation of reasonable limits on police violence. Without ade-
quate policies, civilians—especially the poor and members of disfavored minor-
ity groups—are left to rely on little more than hope to ensure that police will not 
abuse them. But as the authors acknowledge, policies are not themselves suffi-
cient to ensure law enforcement agents respect the rights of all citizens. 
The goal of this response is not to critique or comment on the clear erudition 
of Flores’s work. Instead, I take up the implicit challenge issued in Part V: how 
to move from policies to praxis. Even if all states took the authors’ advice and 
modified their policies to comply with international human rights standards, ci-
vilians would still need to rely on law enforcement agents to actually follow those 
rules. There is substantial evidence that even where there are restrictive policies 
in place, law enforcement agents still resort to inappropriate violence and civil-
ians are still subject to abuse.5 My contribution proceeds in two parts. 
In Part II, this response argues that improvements in law enforcement prac-
tices are difficult to achieve because of two issues that are immensely important 
yet largely ignored. First, scholars in favor of police reform have not conceptu-
alized the problem as a legal compliance problem. There is robust literature on 
why people do or do not obey the law, literature that typically takes as its object 
of concern civilians who do not obey the law. I argue that law enforcement agents 
are similarly situated, and the factors that influence whether civilians comply 
with the law also influence those in law enforcement. Second, with respect to the 
 
 3 See generally Jonathan Herring & Jesse Wall, The Nature and Significance of the Right 
to Bodily Integrity, 76 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 566 (2017) (analyzing how the right to bodily integrity 
prohibits violence against persons in various forms). 
 4  Claudia Flores et al., Global Impunity: How Police Laws & Policies in the World’s 
Wealthiest Countries Fail International Human Rights Standards, 49 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
243 (2021). 
 5 See generally Lynne Peeples, Brutality and Racial Bias: What the Data Say, 583 
NATURE 22 (2020) (presenting evidence on the extent of police violence against civilians in 
the United States). 
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challenges faced by developing countries, I argue that human rights standards 
often came as essentially top-down, Western-focused edicts. Initially, with some 
prominent exceptions, developing countries were not meaningfully included in 
the process of developing these standards. And human rights standards that affect 
law enforcement practices affected newly independent states in particularly im-
portant ways: they prohibited many of the same practices that colonial authorities 
used to assert power over the local population,6 and restricted core executive 
functions of newly independent states. It should come as no surprise that devel-
oping countries face many of the same police abuse problems as wealthier states. 
This is exacerbated by the reality that there are so few developed countries with 
enviable records on police violence. The United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and China often attempt to exert influence in developing countries, and 
all have significant domestic policing problems.7 Without a state to serve as a 
credible example, reform has been fragile and slow, and is often relegated to 
local advocates and international organizations. 
In Part III, I shift focus from policy to praxis. I identify some reforms that 
might be useful, particularly in developing countries, drawing on literature from 
randomized control trials that shows particular promise for the reduction of po-
lice violence. There is no magic formula; reforming police practices is difficult 
and complex. But some approaches have potential. In the end, the goal of this 
response is to help advance the conversation from improving written policies to 
ensuring that those policies affect the behavior of police and the lived experi-






 6 See generally Aoife Duffy, Legacies of British Colonial Violence: Viewing Kenyan De-
tention Camps through the Hanslope Disclosure, 33 L. & HIST. REV. 489 (2015) (describing 
colonial-era police brutality against local populations in Kenya). 
 7 See, e.g., FATAL FORCE, WASH. POST (last visited Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (database documenting fatal 
police shootings in the United States); Eleanor Beardsley, “No Justice in France, Either”: 
French Protest Police Killings in U.S. and at Home, NPR (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/869877701/no-justice-in-france-either-french-protest-po-
lice-killings-in-u-s-and-at-home (describing accusations of police brutality in France); Kojo 
Koram, Systemic Racism and Police Brutality Are British Problems Too, THE GUARDIAN (June 
4, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/04/systemic-racism-police-
brutality-british-problems-black-lives-matter (describing police violence in the United King-
dom); Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Accusations of Brutality Cast Harsh Light on Chinese Police, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/asia/china-police-brutal-
ity-gansu.html (describing police violence in China). 
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II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF POLICE REFORM 
 
Police reform is difficult to achieve for countless reasons, many of which are 
well studied by scholars and advocates.8 However, two factors have not received 
sufficient attention. The first is a conceptual problem. Reform advocates often 
focus on changing codes of conduct or other laws governing police behavior. 
This focus is a necessary first step, but it obscures an embedded assumption: that 
there is something particular about law enforcement agents that makes them 
likely to comply with changes in the rules. I argue that thinking of law enforce-
ment agents as ordinary people would be more helpful. They are as likely as any 
other individuals to comply with, disobey, challenge, or ignore the laws and rules 
governing their conduct.9 Although a full argument is beyond the scope of this 
short response, I sketch out some implications of this conceptual shift. The sec-
ond factor is of particular importance in developing countries. Many human 
rights norms were developed principally by Western advocates and were pro-
moted by Western governments.10 Of course, many of the norms are universal, 
and I do not argue that people or States in the developing world do not share 
these basic norms. In addition, I do not argue that Western human rights norms 
are superior to indigenous or local norms in other parts of the world. Rather, I 
argue that human rights standards, including standards for police conduct, risk 
being seen as norms imposed from the outside by former colonial powers with 
little regard for local conditions. Thus, even if the substance of the rules is con-
sistent with local norms and needs, and even if there are local advocates promot-
ing the changes, there may still be resistance at some level due in part to this 
perception.  
 
 8 See generally Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3189 (2014) (arguing that police reform has been made more difficult in part because of 
lax enforcement of the principal federal statute designed to curb police violence); Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) (showing that changing the 
behavior of individual officers is made more difficult because they can generally avoid per-
sonal liability for their misconduct); Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 117 (2016) (arguing that the increased use of large datasets has the potential 
to change police practices). 
 9 My intuition is that law enforcement agents, as human beings, are no more likely to 
obey rules than other people, but the law treats them as if they are. The doctrine of qualified 
immunity lends support to this intuition, although there are not studies that would definitively 
prove it. Qualified immunity protects police from personal liability in virtually all cases of 
misconduct. Part of the reason for this is that the doctrine requires courts to assume that police 
have obeyed the law and puts the burden on aggrieved parties to demonstrate otherwise. See, 
e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
 10 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201, 214–16 (2001) (arguing that conventional “human rights” 
almost exclusively reflect Western perspectives). 
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A. Reform as a Compliance Problem 
 
Most advocates appear to assume, quite appropriately, that police reform is 
primarily a matter of command and control: with the right policies in place and 
effective leadership and training, law enforcement agents will conform their be-
havior to the law. This assumption is reasonable. Law enforcement personnel are 
agents of the state, act with state authority, and are subject to the laws and poli-
cies of the state. As such, policies are necessary, but they are not sufficient. At-
tempts to change police behavior might be more productive if scholars viewed 
law enforcement agents as ordinary individuals who are subject to the same pres-
sures as anyone else. 
Scholars have long examined why people obey laws. There are many theories 
about why people do or do not comply with the law, but two approaches merit 
particular attention with respect to police behavior. The first is the rational choice 
perspective, which proceeds from the assumption that individuals act to maxim-
ize their utility.11 On this theory, individuals comply with the law if they deter-
mine that the costs of disobeying the law are greater than the costs of obeying 
the law. The individual calculation is different for every person, but scholars 
mainly focus on two variables: (i) the likelihood that non-compliance will be 
detected; and (ii) the severity of the penalty if non-compliance is detected and 
punished.12 Of course, life is never this simple, but the main insight—that people 
perform a rough cost-benefit analysis vis-à-vis choices of legal compliance—
may be helpful in understanding the behavior of law enforcement agents. 
Although hard evidence is difficult to amass on such an inherently theoretical 
subject matter, there are several reasons law enforcement agents might be acting 
rationally when they do not comply with restrictions on the use of force. First, 
one important component of the calculation is the perceived likelihood of detec-
tion. With civilians acting in public, such a calculation might entail wondering 
whether a bystander or victim would report the act to law enforcement. For a 
variety of reasons, ordinary citizens usually perceive that the more egregious the 
crime, the greater the likelihood of its eventual detection. Contrast this to the 
calculation law enforcement personnel might face. While mobile phone cameras 
and other technologies have changed the reality slightly, any such calculation 
done by a member of law enforcement will typically involve two additional ac-
tors external to the individual conducting the mental calculus: the person being 
 
 11 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 172–76 (1968) (describing the rational choice model of legal compliance). 
 12 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 176 (1968) (arguing that a “person commits an offense if the expected utility to him 
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities”). 
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confronted by the officer, and any other police officers that may be present. Un-
der normal circumstances, one of the first actions taken in a scenario that might 
necessitate force is to clear the area of civilians. To the extent the misconduct 
was a violation of law but not of the norms or beliefs of others in law enforce-
ment, the actor might reasonably conclude that law enforcement witnesses would 
not reveal the misconduct. Furthermore, police abuse is often directed against 
individuals with relatively low social capital, such as poor people and minori-
ties.13 Thus, even if police misconduct is witnessed by members of these groups, 
witnesses may be hesitant to report the officer or may be dismissed as not credi-
ble if they do. Accordingly, officers might rationally conclude that they are un-
likely to be discovered or reported if they engage in misconduct, making the 
misconduct more likely. 
Officers might also conclude that even if they are detected, they are unlikely 
to face substantial consequences. The reasons for this are complex and differ by 
country, but the situation in the United States is illustrative: allegations of police 
misconduct are routinely dismissed in court under the doctrine of qualified im-
munity.14 Qualified immunity protects law enforcement agents from liability 
even if they have violated the victim’s constitutional rights, with exceedingly 
narrow exceptions. Law enforcement agents are liable only if they violated 
“clearly established law,”15 which is supposed to protect “all but the plainly in-
competent or those who knowingly violate the law.”16 Officers are rarely held 
liable under this standard.17 Thus, under the rational choice approach, officers 
have little reason to expect consequences for their actions. 
A second major approach is the normative, or constructivist, approach.18 
Scholars in this tradition argue that people comply with laws if they believe the 
relevant authority has the power and the right to set and enforce the rules.19 These 
categories are rough approximations, and it is beyond the scope of this response 
to give a full account of their many strands.20 Further, most individuals do not 
simply “select” a single reason for their legal compliance or non-compliance; 
 
 13 See generally Cassandra Chaney & Ray V. Robertson, Racism and Police Brutality in 
America, 17 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 480 (2013) (describing linkages between police violence and 
racism in the United States). 
 14 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310 
& n.3 (2020) (showing that qualified immunity cases routinely favor the government). 
 15 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 16 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 17  See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310 
(2020) (reporting on qualified immunity cases and relative success rates). 
 18 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (contrasting normative rea-
sons for legal compliance with other frameworks). 
 19 Id. at 4. 
 20 For an explanation of the variations on rational choice theory, see Russell B. Korobkin 
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from 
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–66 (2000). 
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people comply with the law for different reasons at different times. Nonetheless, 
the approaches are instructive. The normative approach asks whether individuals 
believe the law is legitimate, considered from multiple perspectives. It is both 
the perceived legitimacy of the law’s content and the authority of those making 
and enforcing it that matters.21 Scholars in this vein argue that people “obey the 
law because they believe that it is proper to do so.”22 This belief might arise 
because individuals believe the law is just or because they believe the lawmaking 
authority has the power and legitimacy to enforce it, even if they disagree with 
its content.23 
Consider how this might affect attempts to enforce police use-of-force poli-
cies. Affected officers might agree with the regulations and modify their behav-
ior, or they might disagree under the belief that their behavior is appropriate or 
necessary to protect society. If they disagree with the content of the regulations, 
regulatory changes are unlikely to solve the problem. Instead of obeying the new 
regulations out of a sense of duty—the implicit assumption of many scholars and 
advocates—officers may instead conclude that the regulations do not comport 
with their “moral values” or sense of what is appropriate for a situation.24 Para-
doxically, just as it is important for community members to believe that police 
are “supporting and defending community norms” as they enforce the law,25 it 
may be essential that law enforcement agents believe the community’s norms 
comport with their own.   
In addition to concerns about the legitimacy of the content of laws and poli-
cies, officers may also disagree with the legitimacy of the lawmaking or enforc-
ing body behind them. If use-of-force policies are perceived as impositions by 
illegitimate outsiders—either because they come from international standards or 
are imposed by a court—officers may reject them outright. 
Before moving on, a caveat is in order. My discussion of rational choice and 
normative theories is not an argument against the imposition and enforcement of 
strict use-of-force policies. I would object to any model that left it to law enforce-
ment agencies to regulate themselves. Recognizing the importance of legitimacy 
is not the same thing as abdicating legislative power and handing it over to the 
police themselves. Instead, I argue that it is important to recognize that law en-
forcement agents are subject to the same incentives, beliefs, and considerations 
as ordinary people when they choose to comply or not to comply with laws and 
 
 21 See generally TYLER, supra note 18, at 19–39. 
 22 Id. at 178. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and 
the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a 
Group’s Moral Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153, 163 (2003). 
 25 Id. at 162. 
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policies. They are not empty vessels waiting for orders with which they will com-
ply; they are autonomous agents who choose between compliance or non-com-
pliance like anyone else. 
This recognition suggests possible avenues toward reform. First, with respect 
to the likelihood that misconduct will be detected, use-of-force policies should 
contain mandates requiring officers to report the misconduct of others. In the 
Flores study, the authors rightly focused on other, more urgent dimensions of the 
policies studied, but mandatory reporting should be a feature of any use-of-force 
policy. Second, with respect to the low risk of personal sanctions for police mis-
conduct, reform of qualified immunity is an urgent need; policies cannot be ef-
fective if violations do not lead to sanctions. Third, participation in the rulemak-
ing process by all affected parties would increase their legitimacy. More must be 
done to ensure that the norms of law enforcement agencies comport with the 
content of the laws and policies regulating them: bolstering the perceived legiti-
macy of the rules must be an ongoing project. It is not enough to change the rules; 
officers must be convinced that the rules are legitimate. This is not to suggest 
that those who fail to comply are justified in doing so. Instead, the point is that 
reform begins when the rules change; rule changes are not the end of the process. 
And an excellent starting point will involve a seat at the table for the law enforce-
ment personnel ultimately impacted. 
 
B. The Legacy of Colonialism Complicates Police Reform in Many States 
 
Police abuse of civilians is a global problem. Although recent events in the 
United States have received substantial attention, there are also many cases of 
police abuse in developing countries—as highlighted in the Flores study. This 
response is concerned with the implementation difficulties faced by police re-
form advocates in developing nations and identifies two principal causes for such 
difficulties. First, much of the substance of human rights law, including protec-
tions against police violence, was developed by Western States, potentially un-
dermining the credibility of those norms in developing countries left out of the 
process.26 Second, restrictions on police behavior address core executive func-
tions. Inherent in sovereignty is the power to control one’s own police forces. 
States have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within their territories; 
international human rights norms restrict this function. What makes this prob-
lematic is that human rights norms largely developed at the end of the colonial 
 
 26 See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 10, at 214–16 (arguing that the rights typically considered 
“human rights” reflect mostly Western perspectives). 
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era, often by the same governments that had perpetrated or ignored abusive prac-
tices against local populations.27 There is an irony in formerly abusive colonial 
powers promoting restrictions on the ways that sovereign States can address their 
own citizens. While restrictions on police conduct in the form of international 
legal standards are commendable and necessary, local resistance to outside reg-
ulation should not be surprising. 
For most advocates there is a specific set of rights and immunities that consti-
tute “human rights.”28 Contemporary human rights law mostly finds its roots in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other foundational instruments 
of the United Nations system, though the origins of the underlying concepts are 
varied and ancient.29 Omitted from this is a widespread recognition, particularly 
among Western scholars, that human rights laws and norms are hotly contested. 
Indeed, many scholars contest the very idea of a universal set of human rights.30 
For example, most Western scholars believe that human rights law prioritizes 
civil and political rights, such as the right to vote or the right to free speech, over 
economic rights, such as the right to earn a living or the right to development.31 
Recognizing this point matters for police reform advocates. To the extent that 
individuals in developing countries view standards as coming from the outside, 
the standards themselves will be less credible. Recall that under the normative 
theory of compliance, the legitimacy of the content, origins, and execution of 
laws and policies is relevant. People may be less likely to comply with laws that 
are viewed as foreign or other to them and their community. Even if this is not 
the empirical reality behind a legal norm, the perception alone may undermine 
compliance. 
Particularly in former colonies, standards promoted by former colonial abus-
ers are likely to be seen as illegitimate and regarded with suspicion.32 In Nigeria, 
for example, there is evidence of police abuse of citizens, as noted in the Flores 
study. Unsurprisingly, there is also evidence that the public is skeptical of Nige-
rian police. When the British colonized Nigeria, they created police forces that 
 
 27 See generally Barbara Oomen, Donor-Driven Justice and Its Discontents: The Case of 
Rwanda, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887 (2005) (describing the phenomenon of donor states imposing 
human rights reforms in formerly colonized states). 
 28 For a full version of this argument, see Patrick J. Keenan, Financial Globalization and 
Human Rights, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 548–49 (2008). 
 29 See generally Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 
117 (2004) (describing the evolution of human rights norms and their manifestations in law). 
 30 For a complete version of this argument, see Mutua, supra note 10. 
 31 See Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 837, 838–41 (2002) (describing debates about the relative status of civil and political 
rights versus economic, social, and cultural rights). 
 32 See generally Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cul-
tural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838 (2000) (showing 
that many African States question the legitimacy of Western human rights doctrines). 
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were abusive of the local population.33 This abuse continued even after inde-
pendence.34 More recently, researchers found that “members of the public are 
very cynical about the law, and that there are high perceptions of police corrup-
tion and police abuse among the citizens.”35 It appears that contemporary polic-
ing in Nigeria has many consistent features with policing during colonial times. 
Police act as they were taught to act, and police agencies function as they were 
designed to function. When confronted with Western-promoted restrictions on 
police behavior—as welcome as those changes would be to many Nigerians—it 
should come as no surprise that the police are slow to reform. If their behavior is 
seen as common or even appropriate, there is little likelihood that police abusers 
will be turned into face sanctions. And when reform standards are perceived as 
illegitimate, they are unlikely to be embraced. 
 
III. EVIDENCE-BASED REFORM 
 
There is a growing body of evidence regarding police reform,36 including 
some evidence from randomized control trials regarding police practices. In ran-
domized control trials (“RCTs”), scholars randomly assign comparable individ-
uals into groups, each of which receives a different intervention.37 Because the 
 
 33 See Etannibi E.O. Alemika, Policing and Perceptions of Police in Nigeria, 11 POLICE 
STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 161, 163–66 (1988) (describing the history of policing in co-
lonial Nigeria). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Oluwagbenga Michael Akinlabi, Do the Police Really Protect and Serve the Pub-
lic? Police Deviance and Public Cynicism Towards the Law in Nigeria, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST. 158, 166 (2016). 
 36 For a fuller exploration of the uses of data in police reform, see generally Stephen 
Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117 (2016). Rushin argues 
that the federal government could harness existing or planned databases in a variety of ways 
to reform police practices. Id. at 121–25. Rushin’s work highlights the potential of evidence 
to drive reform and the relative dearth of evidence currently. Interestingly, initial empirical 
studies have cast doubt on usual frameworks of police reform, showing them to be based on 
intuitions and assumptions rather than facts. For example, one recent study in the United States 
found that “the body of evidence supporting the effectiveness of ‘the five most common re-
form proposals’ is generally thin and, in some cases, nearly nonexistent.’’ See Robin S. Engel, 
Hannah D. McManus & Gabrielle T. Isaza, Moving Beyond “Best Practice”: Experiences in 
Police Reform and a Call for Evidence to Reduce Officer-Involved Shootings, 687 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 146, 152 (2020). 
 37 ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF 
THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 14 (2011) (“In [a randomized control trial], individuals 
or communities are randomly assigned to different ‘treatments’—different programs or differ-
ent versions of the same program. Since the individuals assigned to different treatments are 
exactly comparable (because they were chosen at random), any difference between them is the 
effect of the treatment.”). 
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two groups are comparable, if there are different outcomes researchers can con-
clude that the difference in outcome is due to different treatment. RCTs are a 
well-established method used to investigate public health issues, but only in the 
past two decades have they been commonly used to test social policies.38 
In this Part, I offer two brief illustrations of the kinds of evidence that might 
prove useful to reform efforts. The studies I highlight are illustrations of poten-
tially useful reforms; they are not proof that any particular intervention can or 
should be implemented broadly. One study comes from India.39 There, research-
ers were seeking to identify ways to improve public perception of police behavior 
to increase community-police cooperation, reduce police corruption and abuse, 
and increase police effectiveness.40 Researchers implemented a series of changes 
in police stations serving up to eight million people.41 Because the communities 
served were similar to each other in all relevant ways and different stations re-
ceived different interventions, researchers believed that they could attribute any 
changes in outcome to the interventions and not to some other factor. The study 
produced a number of important results,42 but three stand out. Researchers found 
that increased training, particularly training in how to better engage with victims 
and members of the public, had demonstrable positive effects on outcomes.43 
Next, incentive programs affected performance positively. When officers knew 
there were clear and likely rewards or penalties associated with their behavior, 
they were more effective and the public was more satisfied.44 Finally, researchers 
found that programs that did not enjoy the support of powerful managers were 
unlikely to actually affect the behavior of ordinary police officers.45 
This evidence suggests ways to link changes in written policies to changes in 
behavior. First, training matters. This is an assumed part of any use-of-force pol-
icy, including those in the Flores study, but it bears emphasizing nonetheless. 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Abhijit Banerjee et al., Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experi-
mental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17912, 2012), https://www.nber.org/system/files/work-
ing_papers/w17912/w17912.pdf. 
 40 See Police Performance and Public Perception in Rajasthan, India, ABDUL LATIF 
JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION LAB, https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/police-perfor-
mance-and-public-perception-rajasthan-india (describing motivations for the study). 
 41  Abhijit Banerjee et al., Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experi-
mental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17912, 2012), https://www.nber.org/system/files/work-
ing_papers/w17912/w17912.pdf. 
 42 See Banerjee et al., supra note 39, at 3–4. 
 43 Id. at 4 (finding that after training, police staff “were more polite with crime victims 
attempting to register a crime, and the victims were overall much more satisfied with the po-
lice’’). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 5 (explaining why some interventions failed to affect behavior). 
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Second, all three of the positive results suggest that interventions viewed as le-
gitimate and certain are more likely to succeed than those viewed as illegitimate. 
When police officers knew that good behavior was likely to lead to a reward or 
bad behavior to a sanction, their performance improved.46 This suggests that the 
insight from the rationalist perspective is at least plausible: people act to maxim-
ize their welfare. Furthermore, that the interventions failed when not supported 
by management lends supports to the normative hypothesis. Lack of buy-in from 
management signals that new policies are illegitimate. It is not clear if lack of 
buy-in undermined confidence in the content of the rules or the authority provid-
ing the rules, but it is clear that a lack of leadership buy-in undermines efficacy. 
Finally, a second study shows some of the difficulties in moving from policy 
to practice. Researchers attempted to change the way police recruits were trained 
in Chicago by introducing a variety of new training methodologies aimed at im-
proving offer-civilian interactions.47 Despite the changes, recruits did not 
demonstrate any significant change in how they were likely to treat members of 
the public, including no change in the likelihood that they would resort to force.48 
Indeed, researchers found that despite the changes in training method, recruits’ 
“desire to resolve situations with force increased significantly” during their time 
in training.49 
This study shows the limitations of policy changes and provides a possible 
explanation. Researchers in the Chicago study concluded that part of the reason 
the intervention was unsuccessful was that the new methods amounted to “swim-
ming upstream against a socialization process that favored toughness and officer 
safety.”50 This is an important caution: policy changes happen alongside, and 
must be considered in conjunction with, a host of other variables. Every well-
meaning change in policy may be accompanied with active officer resistance at 
the level of implementation. The culture of police organizations, a notoriously 
difficult variable to identify, much less study in any systematic way, affects the 





 46 Id. 
 47 See Dennis P. Rosenbaum & Daniel S. Lawrence, Teaching Procedural Justice and 
Communication Skills During Police-Community Encounters: Results of a Randomized Con-
trol Trial with Police Recruits, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 293, 299–300 (2017) (de-
scribing changes in curriculum made as part of a randomized control trial). 
 48 Id. at 310–11 (describing the lack of change in recruit attitudes). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 313. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The study undertaken by Claudia Flores and her co-authors is an important 
foundation upon which to build. They identified deficiencies in every use-of-
force policy they studied. They are correct to argue that these deficiencies must 
be addressed as part of any sensible reform program. In this response, I have 
attempted to identify some of the reasons translating policy changes to perfor-
mance improvements is difficult and have shown that there is hope to be found 
in evidence-based reforms. 
 
